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Using plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for the fiscal years from 1998-99
through 2007-08, this study provides plant-level cross-state/time-series evidence of the impact of employment
protection legislation (EPL) on total factor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity in India. Identification
of the effect of EPL follows from a difference-in-differences estimator inspired by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) that takes advantage of the state-level variation in labor regulation and heterogeneous industry
characteristics. The fundamental identification assumption is that EPL is more likely to restrict firms
operating in industries with higher labor intensity and/or higher sales volatility. Our results show that
firms in labor intensive or more volatile industries benefited the most from labor reforms in their states.
Our point estimates indicate that, on average, firms in labor intensive industries and in flexible labor
markets have TFP residuals 14% higher than those registered for their counterparts in states with more
stringent labor laws. However, no important differences are identified among plants in industries with
low labor intensity when comparing states with high and low levels of EPL reform. Similarly, the
TFP of plants in volatile industries and in states that experienced more pro-employer reforms is 11%
higher than that of firms in volatile industries and in more restrictive states; however, the TFP residuals
of plants in industries with low labor intensity are 11% lower in high EPL reform states than in states
with lower levels of EPL reform. In sum, the evidence presented here suggests that the high labor costs
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It is well known that India’s formal Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) is among the most
stringent in the world. Many believe that this is one of the main reasons behind the stagnant share
of manufacturing output in India’s GDP during the last 40 years (OECD, 2007). Although the
country has recorded impressive output growth rates since the 1970s, the share of manufactures in
total output has remained between 14% and 18%. Though infrastructure and product market reg-
ulation have been major challenges, strict labor laws have been blamed in particular for the poor
performance of large-scale labor intensive manufactures despite India’s labor abundance (Pana-
gariya, 2008; Conway and Herd, 2009; Dougherty et al., 2009). According to the Indian Ministry of
Commerce and Industry (2011), the top ﬁve goods exported during 2010-11 represented almost 50%
of the country’s total exports and they were all relatively capital intensive goods such as petroleum
products, gems and jewelry, transport equipment, machinery and instruments, and pharmaceutical
products. In contrast, ready-made garments, traditionally an unskilled-labor intensive export, has
seen its share in total Indian exports decline from 12.5% to 6% between 2000 and 2010. In 2009,
India was the ﬁfth largest exporter of apparel with 3.6% of the world’s exports (WTO, 2010).
Industrial relations in India fall under the joint jurisdiction of central and state governments, an
arrangement that has generated a degree of variation in labor regulations across states. Although all
states had essentially the same starting point under the License Raj, each state has independently
amended labor regulations, rules and practices during the post-Independence period. In the last
decade, this “natural experiment” setting has been exploited by several empirical studies that have
tried to assess the eﬀects of labor regulation on output, employment, and productivity.1 However,
and despite increasing interest in the topic, the evidence for India is still inconclusive and mostly
limited to industry-level analysis.
One of the most inﬂuential studies of India is Besley and Burgess (2004), which constructs
an index summarizing state-level amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) between 1949
and 1992. The index, henceforth referred to as BB, is used along with several control variables to
explain state-level outcomes corresponding to the organized manufacturing sector using industry-
level panel data for 1958-92. The authors identify a negative impact of pro-worker regulation on
output, investment, employment, and labor productivity among registered manufacturing ﬁrms.
1One must keep in mind that the state-level amendments may not have been as exogenous as a true natural
experiment would require.
1Several papers that also rely on the BB index reach similar conclusions.2
Nonetheless, the validity of the BB index and the econometric methodology used to identify the
eﬀect of excessive pro-worker regulation have been extensively criticized. The main concerns with
the use of this index are related to problems in the coding of labor laws and its exclusive focus on
formal reforms to the IDA. This study tries to overcome the shortcomings of the previous empirical
evidence in the tradition of Besley and Burgess (2004) to evaluate the eﬀect of labor regulation
on the Indian organized manufacturing sector. We make use of a more comprehensive measure of
labor market regulations proposed in OECD (2007) and elaborated in Dougherty (2009). We argue
that this index is superior to the BB index as it includes information on formal and informal labor
market reforms, not only to the IDA but in seven additional areas: the Factories Act, the State
Shops and Commercial Establishments Acts, the Contract labor Act, the role of inspectors, the
maintenance of registers, the ﬁling of returns and union representation.
Using this comprehensive EPL measure and plant-level data from the Annual Survey of Indus-
tries (ASI) for all the ﬁscal years between 1998-99 and 2007-08, we evaluate whether labor market
regulation diﬀerences across Indian states led to a diﬀerential response in industrial performance.3
However, diﬀerences across states in terms of labor regulation may be endogenous. A higher number
of pro-employer reforms in a given state may be driven by the characteristics of the ﬁrms located
in that state.
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we focus on the details of the theoretical mechanisms at
play. As we will show below, unit labor costs increase with more stringent EPL, and more so for
ﬁrms operating in industries with higher labor intensity. This implies that ﬁrms in industries with
higher labor shares will suﬀer the most from the additional costs of hiring and ﬁring workers. Thus,
we implement a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator that exploits both the variation in EPL by state,
as well as the variation in industry-speciﬁc characteristics related to labor intensity and volatility.
In addition, to the extent that such costs act as adjustment costs, they will have more of an eﬀect
in more volatile industries so that the productivity of ﬁrms in more volatile sectors should be more
aﬀected by strict labor laws. By focusing on a speciﬁc mechanism through which EPL reform
operates (labor intensity or volatility), this approach provides stronger evidence of causality.
Previous studies have also exploited the variation in state and industry characteristics4 but
2See Aghion et al. (2008) and Ahsan and Pag´ es (2006) as examples.
3In this paper, EPL is used as a shorthand to refer to a customized measure of state-level labor regulation
reforms in India as presented in OECD (2007) and elaborated in Dougherty (2009). The oﬃcial OECD measure is
country-speciﬁc and has a longstanding standardized deﬁnition, as most recently elaborated in Venn (2009).
4See Gupta et al. (2009) and Bassanini et al. (2009).
2their focus was at the industry level. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study of India to evaluate
the eﬀect of labor regulation on plant-level productivity using a longitudinal sample,5 and is one
of only a few studies on any country to examine labor regulation eﬀects at the plant level.
The evidence presented here shows that ﬁrms in industries with higher labor intensity or higher
sales volatility beneﬁted the most from labor market reforms in their states. The positive eﬀect of
relaxed EPL on organized manufacturing ﬁrms in labor intensive industries is experienced through
higher total factor productivity (TFP) although there is no consistent eﬀect on labor productivity
measured as value added per worker. Similarly, ﬁrms in more volatile industries that experience
pro-employer labor reforms tend to have higher levels of TFP. We also identify a heterogeneous
eﬀect of EPL in labor intensive industries by plant size and ownership type. In particular, we ﬁnd
that smaller ﬁrms and private ﬁrms with a high usage of labor inputs tend to beneﬁt the most from
relaxation of state labor laws. In general, our results suggest that state-level reforms can help to
mitigate the detrimental eﬀects that strict federal labor laws have on industrial outcomes in the
organized Indian manufacturing sector.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, its adds to the literature that focuses
on the eﬀect of labor and product regulation on industrial outcomes and economic performance, of
which Besley and Burgess (2004) has been one of the most inﬂuential studies. It also contributes
to some recent studies on the potential links between labor markets and comparative advantage
that have received special attention in the trade literature. Within this literature, our study is
particularly related to Cu˜ nat and Melitz (2007) and Krishna and Levchenko (2009), who highlight
the role of ﬁrm-level volatility in determining the pattern of comparative advantage.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sketches out the major ﬁndings in the
literature. Section 3 describes the data as well as some basic stylized facts. The empirical strategy
is described in Section 4 while Section 5 displays the results. Some robustness checks are presented
in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and describes the limitations of the study, as well as directions
for future research.
2 Previous Literature
Despite increasing interest in the eﬀect of institutions and regulation in industrial performance, the
theoretical and empirical evidence to support or negate the beneﬁcial eﬀect of EPL relaxation is
5Harrison et al. (2011) use a similar dataset also based on the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) to examine
market share reallocations; however they focus on trade policy reforms.
3still limited. Although labor market equilibrium models such as Garibaldi’s (1998) and Mortensen
and Pissarides’s (1999) predict a negative eﬀect of stricter EPL on job mobility, its eﬀects on
productivity are not that straightforward.
Stricter labor regulation increases the costs of hiring and ﬁring workers, making it more diﬃcult
for the ﬁrm to react to demand or supply shocks that require labor reallocation or staﬀ reduction.
The restriction of labor movement even in more productive ﬁrms or sectors can thus result in
lower productivity levels. Poschke (2009) develops a model that takes into account ﬁrm dynamics
and where ﬁrms receive idiosyncratic productivity shocks. He shows that selection eliminates the
active ﬁrms with the lowest productivity, and entrants imitate more productive survivors. In this
setting, strict EPL ends up reducing ﬁrm value, discouraging not only entry but also the exit of
less productive ﬁrms. Moreover, growth losses tend to be larger when productivity is more volatile.
This latter result is in line with previous ﬁndings of worse eﬀects of strict EPL for ﬁrms operating
in more turbulent sectors (see Bentolila and Bertola, 1990).
Negative eﬀects of EPL on productivity can also be expected to act through lower worker eﬀorts
due to a lower threat of getting ﬁred. Product or technology innovation can also be discouraged if
the ﬁrm has to face high labor costs and high layoﬀ costs in case of failure.
Another branch of the literature suggests that the net eﬀects of EPL on productivity may be
positive. Workers may be more willing to invest in human capital speciﬁc to the ﬁrm if their
jobs are better protected. Firms may also be willing to invest more to increase labor productivity
as an alternative to downsizing. Bassanini et al. (2009) provide an extensive discussion of these
theoretical results suggesting that there might be an “optimal” level of EPL.
A recent paper by Cu˜ nat and Melitz (2007) studies the link between volatility, labor market
ﬂexibility, and international trade. They develop a model and test it using country-industry level
data and ﬁnd that countries with more ﬂexible labor markets fare better in more volatile industries,
where their ability to adjust to unexpected shocks is more important. This implies that labor
market reforms might have diﬀerential eﬀects across industries and that their eﬀects might be more
beneﬁcial among sectors with a higher dispersion of within-industry shocks.
The empirical literature available is quite inconclusive and has tried to measure the eﬀects
of EPL on industrial outcomes using cross-country studies with industry-level data or industry-
state-level data. Among the ﬁrst group of papers, Micco and Pag´ es (2007) implement a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimator in a cross-section of industry-level data for a sample of developed and
developing countries. They are able to identify the eﬀect of EPL by arguing that sector diﬀer-
4ences in the intrinsic volatility of demand and supply shocks can lead to diﬀerential responses to
labor regulation. Their results show that EPL reduces turnover, employment, and value added
in more volatile industries but they only ﬁnd weak evidence of a negative relationship between
labor regulation stringency and labor productivity. Similarly, Bassanini et al. (2009) use aggregate
cross-country/time-series data on OECD countries to measure the diﬀerential eﬀects of country-
level EPL on industry-level productivity. They ﬁnd that dismissal regulations tend to generate
larger TFP growth loses among industries with a high layoﬀ propensity relative to industries where
ﬁrms rely less on layoﬀs to adjust labor-inputs’ usage.
A recent strand in the empirical literature focuses on India, one of the countries with the
strictest labor regulation in the world. Although Indian labor laws were strongly inﬂuenced by the
British model inherited on independence, it is clear that Indian labor regulation is substantially
more protective than the UK’s present system, as shown in Figure 1. The gap between these
countries broadens after 1979, which is when a conservative government committed to labor market
deregulation was elected in the UK. India fares even worse when compared to the US. However, the
Indian case is particularly interesting and a nice setting for empirical studies given the ability of
state governments to introduce formal and informal amendments to the labor laws. Consequently,
changes in the application of the law at the state-level have resulted in important variations in the
stringency of EPL within the same country.
First promoted by Besley and Burgess (2004), most studies focusing on India tend to use cross-
state and intertemporal variation in labor legislation as measured by state IDA amendments. These
studies ﬁnd that changes towards more ﬂexible labor regulation are correlated with higher levels
of manufacturing output, employment, and labor productivity in the organized industrial sector.
For example, Aghion et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, following delicensing, industries located in states with
pro-employer labor regulations grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments. Ahsan
and Pag´ es (2009) also use the BB index but decompose it into amendments that reduce transaction
costs of initiating and sustaining industrial disputes and those that increase job security and reduce
labor ﬂexibility. Their results suggest that regulations that increase the cost of settling disputes
are more costly for employment than the restrictions directly imposed by the IDA.
Focusing on rural India, Adhvaryu et al. (2009) develop a partial equilibrium model where
agriculture exists alongside industry. They use use rainfall ﬂuctuations to measure exogenous un-
observed demand and cost shocks, and analyze the response of states with diﬀerent labor regulations
as measured by the BB index. Their results show that the change in employment is signiﬁcantly
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Comparing Regulatory Regimes”, International Labor Review, 146: 133-162.
Notes: The laws reported for India are mostly federal laws. The authors also report some state-level variations in
case law, especially for the most heavily industrialized states. The labor regulation index is a score obtained out of
40 possible points, where higher values indicate more stringent regulation.
greater in states with laxer labor laws. However, shocks do not generate a diﬀerential response in
output or proﬁts. This is explained by a greater adjustment of the use of capital and materials in
pro-worker states.
Despite its extended use in the empirical literature, the BB index has been heavily criticized.
Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009) claims that the Besley and Burgess (2004) scoring system can erro-
neously classify a state as pro-employer or pro-worker with just one or two amendments to the IDA
in the 50 years covered by the index. Nagaraj (2004) points out that the BB index focuses only
on the IDA, abstracting from several other labor laws that aﬀect industrial performance. Another
important critique is its exclusive focus on formal amendments, which ignores changes in the actual
practices and enforcement of the labor laws. In fact, most recent changes in state-level practices
have resulted from judicial interpretations of the laws by the Supreme Court. It is thus not sur-
prising updates of the BB index, using Malik (2006), show very few changes in labor regulation
after 1992. Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009) also emphasizes the fragility of Besley and Burgess’ (2004)
econometric results. In particular, he criticizes the use of irrelevant state-level control variables
and inadequate tests for robustness as well as the fragility of their results once state-speciﬁc time
trends are introduced in their model.
6A recent study by Gupta et al. (2009) tries to overcome some of the BB index’s measurement
problems by using a simple majority rule across three EPL measures available in the empirical
literature, including the BB index. They argue that this approach has the advantage of weeding
out any measurement error, unless there are systematic mistakes in coding the states across diﬀerent
indicators. Using this state-level composite measure of EPL, they exploit industry-level variation
in labor usage to test the diﬀerential impact of product and labor market regulations. They ﬁnd
that labor intensive industries in states with ﬂexible labor regulation have higher levels of value
added.
Bhattacharjea (2009) departs from Besley and Burgess’ (2004) work by focusing on the legisla-
tive content of the state-level amendments as well as on the judicial interpretations to Chapter V
of the IDA.6 Although his proposed index is better in the sense that it includes information on
practices at the ground level, he still focuses on only one labor law. His results on the eﬀect of
state-level labor regulation reform on the number of factories, value added, and share of contract
labor are mixed but he highlights that his main contribution lies on his critique of the earlier
literature.
All in all, the evidence on the eﬀects of EPL on TFP and/or TFP growth in India is still scarce.
This gap in the literature is even larger when we focus on the evidence available at the plant or ﬁrm
level. Besides the well known diﬃculties involved in TFP estimation at the plant level, the fact
that state-level changes in the labor regulation may be endogenously determined requires additional
sources of variation in the data to identify the eﬀect of EPL on plant-level productivity.
In particular, we expect labor regulation diﬀerences to have heterogenous eﬀects on produc-
tivity across industries with diﬀerent levels of labor intensity. Assuming there is a Cobb-Douglas
production function speciﬁc to each manufacturing industry, Y = ALαK1−α, the unit cost function











where w and r are the labor and capital input prices. Employment protection legislation is captured
through the constant Rs which multiplies wages in state s to capture the eﬀective cost of labor.
Whenever labor legislation imposes additional costs through layoﬀ regulation or hiring restrictions,
Rs will be above 1.
6This chapter relates to ﬁrms’ requirements to obtain government permission for layoﬀs, retrenchments, and
closures.







which is positive and increasing in α. In other words, the percentage change in the unit cost is
higher as EPL becomes stricter and more so for labor intensive industries. Our study will then
identify the eﬀect of EPL by taking advantage of the state-level variation in labor regulation as
well as the industry-level variation in labor intensity as measured by an estimate of α.
3 Data
The data used in this study comes from the Indian Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), conducted
by the Indian Ministry of Statistics (MOSPI). We use ASI data from the 1998-99 through 2007-08
ﬁscal years to obtain an unbalanced panel of registered manufacturing plants. Previous studies
using the same data source have been unable to build a plant-level panel due to the lack of factory
identiﬁers that have only been made available recently.7 We diﬀer from virtually all of them in
that we make use of a subsample of plants that constitute a panel.8
The ASI sampling frame includes all factories employing 10 or more workers using power, or 20
or more workers without using power. In general, the ASI’s basic strategy over the years has been
to divide the survey frame into census and sample sectors, where the census sector includes larger
plants. Although this strategy has remained intact, the deﬁnition of census and sample sectors
has undergone some changes over the years. Between the 1998-1999 and 2007-2008 rounds, the
size threshold for the census sector ﬂuctuated between 50 and 200 workers, so that only plants
employing 200 or more workers are always surveyed during the years analyzed.9 The remaining
plants are randomly sampled. For more details about the sampling design changes as well as a
detailed description of the data problems present in ASI see Bollard et al. (2010); Harrison et al.
(2011) discuss the new longitudinal sample.
ASI data provides factory reports on output, value added, ﬁxed capital, investment, materials,
fuel, labor, and labor expenditures. It also provides information on the type of ownership, the type
of organization, as well as the start-up year of each plant. The ASI reports the book value of ﬁxed
7We thank India’s Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) for providing us the data we use for this study. The
conﬁdentiality of the unit level data was maintained and adequate precautions have been taken to avoid disclosing
the identity of the units directly or indirectly.
8A notable exception is Harrison et al. (2011), which uses the ASI panel to examine the role of market-share
reallocations in aggregate productivity growth in India’s organized manufacturing sector between 1985 and 2004.
9All industrial units belonging to the ﬁve least industrially developed states (Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland,
Tripura and Andaman & Nicobar Islands) were also included in the census sector.
8capital both at the beginning and at the end of the ﬁscal year, net of depreciation. Our measure of
ﬁxed capital will be the average of the net book value of ﬁxed capital at the beginning and at the
end of the ﬁscal year, while all other variables are measured at the end. The data collected from
the ASI are at current prices and must be corrected for price changes over time. Details on the
speciﬁc deﬂators used for each variable can be found in Appendix A.
Table 1: Percentage of missing observations in each ASI round
Year Total Obs.a/ Missing Obs.b/ % Missing
1998-1999 23,620 4,290 18.2
1999-2000 24,684 6,944 28.1
2000-2001 31,053 8,349 26.9
2001-2002 33,387 8,579 25.7
2002-2003 33,800 8,625 25.5
2003-2004 45,429 12,483 27.5
2004-2005 39,714 11,503 29.0
2005-2006 43,675 10,039 23.0
2006-2007 43,304 12,812 29.6
2007-2008 38,439 10,777 28.0
Total 357,105 94,401 26.4
a/ After removal of non-operative plants and plants with non-
positive values of output and ﬁxed capital stock. Only 7% of all
observations are dropped for these reasons.
b/ Observations are coded as missing when the factory does not
have data on output, value added, materials, fuels, ﬁxed capital,
labor, or labor expenditures.
The raw data consist of about 384,000 observations over 10 years, with an average of about
38,000 plants surveyed each year. We remove observations corresponding to non-operative plants
(26,553) and plants with non-positive values of output and negative values of ﬁxed capital stock
(499). Table 1 shows that following this, on average, 26% of the observations in each round have
missing values for output, value added, materials, fuels, ﬁxed capital, or labor. After removing these
observations, we also drop 3 manufacturing industries (2-digit NIC) with too few observations: other
mining and quarrying, recycling, and oﬃce, accounting, and communication equipment. Following
Aghion et al. (2008) and Gupta et al. (2009), we also drop “other” manufacturing industries. This
category groups diﬀerent activities which are likely to vary across states, making it incomparable
across states. Finally, we also drop the states and union territories of Jammu & Kashmir, Chandi-
garh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Pondicherry,
and Andaman & Nicobar Islands due to lack of information on employment legislation. We also
exclude Lakshadweep due to lack of data in the ASI and Goa given its economy’s dependence on
9tourism.
The ﬁnal sample consists of 239,921 plant-year observations with data on 103,478 plants in 20
states. Almost 60% of the observations and 74% of the plants in our data come from the sample
sector. Moreover, almost 50% of the plants appear in only one round of the survey. As expected,
these are smaller plants, with an average of 48 workers. This is an important limitation of the ASI;
since plants in the sample sector are not deliberately followed over time, entry and exit for smaller
plants is missed. Due to changes in the census threshold size, exit and entry is only consistently
observed for census plants with at least 200 workers. We call this sample the restricted census
sample which contains 49,895 plant-year observations on 11,343 plants. Basic statistics on the ﬁnal
sample are presented in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
We rely on the restricted census sample to obtain TFP estimates but use information on all the
plants surveyed to measure the eﬀect of EPL on productivity. To take into account simultaneity and
selection biases, we obtain production function estimates using the Olley-Pakes estimator. Since
this approach uses information on plants’ exits and lagged values of some variables, we only apply
it to the restricted census sample. We then apply estimates of the production function’s parameters
to the full sample of plants and obtain TFP residuals for all plants in ASI’s census and sample
sectors.
An additional problem posed by ASI data is the substantial number of outliers. To reduce their
inﬂuence in our estimates, we “winsorized” the data, following Bollard et al. (2010). This procedure
basically implies top-coding and bottom-coding the 1% tails for each plant-level variable. In other
words, for each year and each variable we replace outliers in the top 1% tail (bottom 1% tail) with
the value of the 99th (1st) percentile of that variable. This procedure was applied separately to
each 2-digit industry.10
Our measure of labor reform comes from the OECD index which summarizes state-level indica-
tors of procedural changes to the implementation of labor laws either through formal amendments
or through de facto practices (Dougherty, 2009). The OECD, with the support of the All-India
Association of Employers (AIOE), surveyed 21 Indian states in 2007. The EPL index reﬂects the
extent to which procedural or administrative changes have reduced transaction costs in relation to
labor issues. It is constructed using data from a survey instrument developed to identify areas in
which Indian states have experienced speciﬁc changes to the implementation and administration
10We do not remove these outliers because we would have generated an additional loss of 59,896 observations, about
25% of the complete sample.
10of labor laws. The survey covered 50 speciﬁc subjects of possible reform in 7 major areas of labor
regulation in addition to the IDA: the Factories Act, the State Shops and Commercial Establish-
ments Acts, the Contract Labor Act, the role of inspectors, the maintenance of registers, the ﬁling
of returns and union representation. We use the ordinal EPL count index, rebased and rescalled
from zero to one, which is essentially the p of areas in which pro-employer labor reform occurred.
It is worth emphasizing that, although the OECD index can be separated by its subcomponents,
we rely on the aggregate measure of labor reform since the index was designed to capture a state’s
general stance towards labor regulations more than the character of speciﬁc reforms.
To add state-level controls to our estimates, we gathered time series data on population, tele-
phone availability, installed electric capacity, and paved road length. State population comes from
census population data for 1991, 2001, and 2011, and it is linearly interpolated for other years.
Time series data on ﬁxed and mobile phones per 100 population comes from the Ministry of Statis-
tics and Programme Implementation’s (MOSPI) website. Installed electric capacity, measured as
kilowatts per million people on the state, is obtained from the Annual Report of the Indian Ministry
of Power for the years 1997-98, 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06, and 2007-08.
State-wise surfaced road length is obtained from two sources: i) the Basic Road Statistics of India
report from the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways for the years 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07,
and 2007-08, and ii) the Planning Commission’s 9th and 10th Five Year Plans. Road density is
measured as paved kilometers per thousand people in the state.
We also include an OECD measure of state-level product market regulation as a time-invariant
control to take into account the potential role of product regulation as a complement (or substitute)
of labor market laws. The product market regulation index is taken from Conway and Herd
(2008) and it contains information on state intervention and legal or administrative barriers to
entrepreneurship.
In our robustness checks, we will also make use of the BB index that we update through 2008
using Malik (2010) as well as Gupta et al.’s (2009) labor market regulation composite index. The
latter is based on a simple majority rule across the EPL indicators proposed in Besley and Burgess
(2004), Bhattacharjea (2006), and Dougherty (2009). States are coded as pro-labor, pro-business,
or neutral if the majority of the studies considered classiﬁed them as such. Additionally, we check
the robustness of our results using industry-level layoﬀ propensity instead of the measure of labor
intensity captured by the estimated αs. Layoﬀ propensities are measured for the US between 2002
and 2003 with data from the 2004 CPS Displaced Workers Supplement (see Table A.3 in Bassanini
11et al., 2009).11 Using these propensities, we construct a dummy variable for above and below the
median industry.
We must emphasize that the ASI only provides data on organized manufacturing plants. In a
country where the informal sector constitutes a majority of the labor force and the unorganized
sector produces a third of total manufacturing value added, there is also a need to understand how
EPL reforms have aﬀected unorganized plants. A source of data on these plants is the National
Sample Survey Organization’s (NSSO) survey but it is only carried out every ﬁve years. This
lack of data comparable to the ASI forces most researchers to focus exclusively on the registered,
or organized sector. However, this focus is also appropriate since labor market rigidities in the
organized sector constrain the absorption of formal workers, who tend to be more productive, receive
higher wages, and face better working conditions than workers in the informal sector (Gupta et al.,
2009). Moreover, Goldar and Aggarwal (2010) provide some evidence on the eﬀects of labor market
reforms in the unorganized manufacturing sector. Using the OECD labor market reform index for
Indian states, they ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relationship between labor laws’ ﬂexibility and
the probability of being a casual worker both in the formal and informal manufacturing sector,
although the eﬀect in the organized sector is far stronger.
3.1 Basic Patterns
Using the OECD index, we classiﬁed states as having ﬂexible EPL when they were above the
median state according to the degree of labor regulation reforms carried out. Figure 2 plots the
cumulative distribution of output and employment by labor laws’ rigidity. Panel (a) suggests that
the variation in labor standards across states may have allowed some states to fare better than
others; the distribution of output in states with ﬂexible labor laws ﬁrst order dominates that of
states with more stringent regulation. However, panel (b) of Figure 2 suggests that EPL does not
seem to inﬂuence formal employment. Although these patterns are suggestive, we need to control
for the states’ total population to get a better idea of the general picture.
Figure 3 plots output and employment per capita at the state level in 2000 against our EPL
reform indicator.12 Each observation in the scatter plot represents a state. Even after controlling
for the state’s population, Panel (a) in Figure 3 shows that there is a modest positive relationship
between output per capita and the preponderance of labor law reforms in the state. However, this
11The industry classiﬁcation in this data (ISIC Rev. 3) does not exactly match the 2-digit industry classiﬁcation of
the ASI, so in some cases we had to merge Indian industries to make them comparable to those in the United States.
12The OECD labor reform index has been re-scaled so that 0 corresponds to the lowest level of reform and 1
indicates the highest level of reform at the state level.
12pattern is much weaker for formal employment per capita as shown in panel (b).
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However, diﬀerences in the number of plants in each state may be driving these patterns. To
deal with this, Figure 4 decomposes total output and employment by EPL ﬂexibility into their
extensive and intensive margins. While the extensive margin is captured by the number of plants
(N), the intensive margin is measured by the average output or average employment per plant
(Q/N or L/N). Both in terms of output and employment, states with more ﬂexible regulation fare
13better than plants operating in more restrictive labor markets. However, most of this “advantage”
seems to be explained by the evolution of the extensive margin. On average, intensive margin
diﬀerences explain about 36% of the output gap and 9% of the employment diﬀerences between
ﬂexible and inﬂexible states.13
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Figure 5 plots the distribution of TFP and labor productivity by EPL and labor intensity. We
obtain TFP estimates separately for each industry (so that scaling is not an issue) using the Olley-
Pakes approach in the subsample of ongoing plants in ASI’s panel. Sub-section 4.1 below describes
the details of the estimation of TFP residuals, which yields unbiased estimates of the production
function coeﬃcients. In particular, we rely on the output elasticity with respect to labor, α,
estimated in the panel and identify labor intensive industries as those with an ˆ α above the median
industry. Following Besley and Burgess (2004), we also show labor productivity measured as value
added per employee, net of industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Panels (a) and (b) show that industries with high
labor intensity experience a greater improvement in their TFP distribution from the relaxation of
labor laws’ enforcement when compared to less labor intensive industries. Additionally, panels (c)
and (d) show that, irrespective of the industry’s labor usage, the distribution of labor productivity
13Let the subscripts 0 and 1 correspond to outcomes in inﬂexible and ﬂexible labor markets, respectively. Output
































where the ﬁrst term in the right hand side captures output diﬀerences coming from the intensive margin for a ﬁxed
number of plants. The second term ﬁxes output per plant to capture extensive margin diﬀerences.
14in ﬂexible states is always to the right of that of states with stricter EPL but the distance between
distributions is larger in labor intensive industries.
So far, this preliminary evidence suggests that labor intensive industries beneﬁt the most from
EPL relaxation in Indian states. Section 5 below will test if the patterns identiﬁed for productivity
remain relevant after a more rigorous analysis.
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.
4 Empirical Strategy
The main objective of this study is to assess the eﬀect of employment regulation reform in India
on TFP and labor productivity between 1998-99 and 2007-08. The basic speciﬁcation proposed to
evaluate productivity performance is similar to the one used by Aghion et al. (2006), in the sense
15that we take advantage of state-level variation in labor regulation, but we extend it to incorporate
industry-level variation. Our fundamental assumption is that EPL reform is more likely to restrict
plants operating in industries with higher labor intensity, or alternatively higher volatility.
Consider the partial equilibrium eﬀect of a change in EPL derived in (1). The impact on
productivity is expected to be larger in industries where plants rely more on labor than in industries
in which this input is relatively less important. We can also think of more volatile industries having
a harder time adjusting their labor input usage when strict labor regulations are in place. To capture
the eﬀect of labor regulation reform, we use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator inspired by Rajan
and Zingales (1998). By comparing cross-industry diﬀerences in states with diﬀerent levels of labor
reform we can evaluate the eﬀect of EPL changes towards pro-employer legislation on productivity
levels. Labor intensive industries will be more constrained by labor regulation so the impact of
EPL reform is identiﬁed using industries with a lower output elasticity with respect to output as
a control group. Relaxation in labor regulation may also interact with industry-level diﬀerences
in the dispersion of plant-level shocks to generate larger TFP gains among sectors with a higher
dispersion of these shocks.
Below, we brieﬂy describe the TFP estimates used in this study. Next, we proceed to describe
the econometric model used to measure the impact of labor reform on manufacturing plants.
4.1 TFP Measures
When trying to estimate a production function using observed plant-level variables, obtaining TFP
measures from the residuals encompasses several measurement and econometric problems. On
one hand, measurement of outputs and inputs generates an aggregation problem, especially in
multiproduct plants. Another measurement issue relates to capital usage; since it is very tough to
obtain data on capital consumption as an input in the production process, the researcher has to
settle for the book value of total capital and machinery involved in the production process.
Although the previous problems are complex enough, there is not much the empirical researcher
can do about them but try to collect better quality and more detailed micro data. In addition to
these problems, several econometric diﬃculties arise when estimating production functions at the
plant level. Two of the most prominent and serious problems are simultaneity and selection biases.








where Yit are physical units of output and Lit, Kit, Mit, and Fit measure labor, ﬁxed capital,
16materials, and fuels, respectively. Since Ait enters the right hand side in a multiplicative way,
aﬀecting all the other factors’ marginal product simultaneously, it represents the TFP. Taking
logarithms allows us to use a linear estimation model described by:
yit = αlit + βkit + γmit + λfit + uit (2)
where small letters are used for logs.
From the estimation of equation (2), we can retrieve the error term uit, which is the log of
plant-speciﬁc Ait, provided that the coeﬃcients on the inputs are consistently estimated. OLS
estimation does not yield consistent estimates if plants’ choices on exit and on factor demands
(when they continue operating) depend on their productivity. This fact generates both a selection
and a simultaneity problem in the estimation of production functions.
Olley-Pakes (1996) deals with the simultaneity problem by using the ﬁrm’s investment decision
to proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. It is assumed that a higher value of the productivity
shock observed by the ﬁrm (but unobserved by us) will induce higher investment today. The Olley-
Pakes approach also oﬀers a correction for selection bias due to exit. In the ﬁrst stage, a probit of
survival is estimated as a function of a polynomial of capital and investment and the ﬁtted values
from this regression are used in the second stage to consistently estimate the production function
parameters.14
Since this technique requires information on exit and lagged values of some variables, we estimate
the parameters in (2) using Olley-Pakes in the restricted census sample, for which panel data is
available. We estimate the coeﬃcients for capital, labor, materials, and fuels separately for each
industry and assume that these estimates are applicable to plants in the census as well as in the
sample sector. We can then obtain TFP as a residual for all the plants using the industry-speciﬁc
coeﬃcient estimates. Estimating TFP using industry-speciﬁc regressions allows for diﬀerences in
the production function’s coeﬃcients, including a constant term, which yields unit-free productivity
residuals that are comparable across industries. In the end, TFP residuals are obtained as the
exponential of the residual in (2).15
14See Olley and Pakes (1996). Their approach assumes a strictly monotonic relationship between output and
investment so that all observations with zero investment are dropped. An alternative approach to deal with the
simultaneity bias is oﬀered by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), who use intermediate inputs as a proxy for investment
to avoid losing observations. However, only 4% of the plant-year observations in the restricted census sample used to
estimate TFP have zero investment. Moreover, unlike Olley-Pakes, Levinsohn-Petrin methodology does not oﬀer a
correction for selection bias. For more details on the problems faced when estimating productivity as well as available
solutions, see Arnold (2005).
15Notice that since the error is mean zero, this explains why the mean of the TFP distribution in Figure 5 is so
close to 1.
17To estimate TFP at the plant level, we use real gross output instead of value added as the
dependent variable. According to Basu and Fernald (1997) and Carlsson et al. (2011), the use of
value added is only valid for TFP estimation under perfect competition and constant returns to
scale.16 Labor is measured in number of workers and ﬁxed capital is measured as the average of
the net book real value of ﬁxed capital at the beginning and at the end of the ﬁscal year. The
amount of fuels and materials consumed is used to measure the usage of these inputs. Investment is
measured by the gross value of additions to ﬁxed capital. All the variables are measured in rupees
at the end of the period and in 1993-94 constant prices, unless otherwise noted.
4.2 Econometric Model
Our analysis of the impact of labor reform on manufacturing outcomes relies on this basic model:
log(Wfist) = θ0 + θ1LIi + θ2Rs + θ3(LIi × Rs) + ηt + εfist (3)
In equation (3), Wfist is some performance outcome for plant f, in industry i and state s,
at year t. We analyze TFP and labor productivity (measured as value added per worker), but
Appendix B also provides some evidence on total gross output and total value added. LIi denotes
industry’s i labor intensity measure while state labor reform is captured by Rs.
Our indicator of Rs is a dummy variable based on the normalized count of EPL reforms in each
state. We label states as having ﬂexible regulation when their labor reform index is at or above
the median state in terms of the proportion of state-level reforms (using the count index). We
adopt this dummy speciﬁcation because the OECD measure of labor reform cannot be considered
a continuous variable but is closer to an ordinal or categorical variable. However, there are too
many categories to use it as such and the dummy speciﬁcation eases presentation of the results.
To measure LIi, we construct a dummy variable for above and below the median labor intensive
industry based on the ˆ αs obtained from the estimation of (2).17 We believe that the use of ˆ α to
measure the intrinsic labor intensity in each industry is superior to the use of the share of labor
expenditures in total output. The use of the estimated output elasticity with respect to labor
overcomes the potential biases that the ratio of labor expenditures to output may have due to the
endogeneity of the plant’s input choices. Moreover, since our TFP estimation using Olley-Pakes’
methodology takes into account year ﬁxed eﬀects, ˆ α provides a clean estimate of the underlying
16See Appendix C in Carlsson et al. (2011). They show that a residual measure of TFP that comes from value
added is not independent of the use of intermediate inputs and factor input growth when there are increasing or
decreasing returns to scale.
17Again, this speciﬁcation follows the one of Rs and facilitates the exposition of the results.
18labor intensity of each industry that is not biased by exogenous demand or supply shocks in the
inputs markets.
An alternative speciﬁcation of (3) uses industry volatility measures instead of labor intensity. In
that case, we follow Krishna and Levchenko (2009) and measure industry volatility by the standard
deviation of the annual growth rate of plants’ output. We then construct a dummy variable for
above and below the median volatile industry.
Since our measure of EPL reform is time invariant and measured at the state level, we cannot
include state ﬁxed eﬀects. Similarly, our labor intensity indicator is ﬁxed at the industry level so
it restrains us from including industry ﬁxed eﬀects.18 We control for year ﬁxed eﬀects, denoted by
ηt in equation (3), and add a plant-speciﬁc trend.19 Robust variance estimates are used to adjust
standard deviations for within-state correlation. We also incorporate additional controls in our
estimates to make sure we take into account the eﬀect of state-level characteristics.
The coeﬃcient θ3 on the interaction between LIi and Rs will capture the heterogeneous eﬀect of
EPL reform on industries with diﬀerent labor intensity. Given that Rs is higher when state labor
reforms make EPL more ﬂexible, a positive coeﬃcient on the interaction implies that plants in
industries that use labor more intensively fare better in states with pro-employer labor regulation.
In the alternative speciﬁcation, which uses industry volatility measures instead of labor intensity,
the interaction term should also have a positive coeﬃcient since more volatile plants are expected
to beneﬁt the most from laxer labor regulations.
5 Results
The results presented in Table 2 provide initial evidence of a beneﬁcial eﬀect on multifactor and
labor productivity for labor intensive industries in states with higher levels of pro-employer labor
reform. The positive and signiﬁcant interaction of LIi and Rs in column 1 shows that manufacturing
plants with high labor requirements that operate in states moving towards more ﬂexible regulation
exhibit larger TFP gains than plants in less labor intensive industries. The interaction in the value
added per worker equation is also positive but it is not signiﬁcant.
The point estimates from Table 2 imply that there are important multifactor productivity
gains from conducting more labor reforms, particularly for plants in labor intensive industries.
In 2008, the ratio of the geometric mean of TFP for plants in states with ﬂexible labor markets
18Full collinearity restrains us from including industry-year, state-year, or industry-state ﬁxed eﬀects.
19Of course, this trend is only relevant for plants present in multiple years and its removal does not quantitatively
or qualitatively aﬀect the results.




High labor intensity 0.016 -0.115*
(0.051) (0.060)
Pro-employer EPL reform 0.013 0.260**
(0.035) (0.109)




Firm trend yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




over the geometric mean of TFP for plants in states with inﬂexible labor markets is 1.17 in labor
intensive industries, but it is close to one in industries with lower ˆ αs.20 In other words, a plant in
a labor intensive industry that moves from an inﬂexible to a ﬂexible state would get an average
TFP improvement of about 17% while TFP gains are close to zero in industries with lower labor
intensity.
To check the robustness of our ﬁndings, we add a number of control variables to take into
account state characteristics. These include both time-variant as well as time-invariant controls
at the state level. Among the ﬁrst group, we use the log of ﬁxed and mobile phones’s availability
per 100 population, log of the installed electric capacity per million people, and the log of road
density. Information on telephones, installed electric capacity, and road density are reasonable
proxies for the general conditions of infrastructure, which are expected to be positively related to
manufacturing output. We also include the OECD product market regulation index from Conway
and Herd (2008) that measures how much regulations restrict competition.
Table 3 shows that the positive eﬀect identiﬁed for labor intensive plants in ﬂexible labor
markets is still present for TFP once we control for state characteristics. The interaction between
EPL reform and high labor intensity is positive and signiﬁcant. Once state-level controls are
introduced, our point estimates indicate that, on average, plants in labor intensive industries and
20Using the parameter estimates from Table 2, the mean values of the trend, and the year dummy corresponding
to 2008, we predict log(TFP) for 4 groups: i) plants in states with high levels of EPL reform and high ˆ αs, ii) plants
in states with low levels of EPL reform and high ˆ αs, iii) plants with high levels of EPL reform and low ˆ αs, and iv)
plants with low levels of EPL reform and low ˆ αs. To obtain 1.17, for example, we get the diﬀerence between the
predictions of log(TFP) for group i) and ii) and exponentiate it to get the ratio of their TFP in levels.
20operating in ﬂexible labor markets have a TFP residual that is 14% higher than it is among plants
in states with low levels of EPL reform and high ˆ αs. Among plants in industries with low ˆ αs,
TFP gains from EPL reform are negligible. Although the interaction of EPL reform and labor
intensity is not signiﬁcant in the value added per worker equation, there are slightly larger gains
among plants in labor intensive industries. While plants in industries with low ˆ αs see their labor
productivity increase by 28% where EPL reforms are more extended, the eﬀect of EPL reform in
labor intensive industries translates into VA/L increases of 45%.





High labor intensity 0.004 -0.118*
(0.054) (0.062)
Pro-employer EPL reform -0.023 0.248**
(0.044) (0.092)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform 0.153** 0.124
(0.063) (0.075)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.043** 0.031
(0.019) (0.044)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.018 0.019
(0.021) (0.115)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.014 -0.027
(0.014) (0.065)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




Next, we try to identify diﬀerential eﬀects by plant size and type of ownership. Let Xfist denote
a speciﬁc plant characteristic, such as size or ownership type. We extend the model in (3) in the
following way:
log(Wfist) = θ0 + θ1LIi + θ2Rs + θ3(LIi × Rs)
+ θ4Xfist + θ5(LIi × Xfist) + θ6(Rs × Xfist) + θ7(LIi × Rs × Xfist) + ηt + εfist
21Although θ3 will still give us the average eﬀect of the interaction of labor intensity and labor
reform on productivity, the coeﬃcient θ7 becomes particularly important since it will capture any
heterogeneous eﬀects due to diﬀerences in Xfist.
In the case of plant size, Xfist will be a matrix of 4 size dummies. These are constructed using
number of workers with cutoﬀs at 50, 100, and 250. The ﬁrst cutoﬀ responds to the presence of a
few labor laws that are enforced starting at this establishment size. The second cutoﬀ is consistent
with IDA’s national threshold set in 1982. The last cutoﬀ is in line with empirical evidence for
India, above which plant TFP was observed to be substantially higher (Dougherty et al., 2009).
This check is particularly important since larger plants are subject to stricter labor regulation but
are also more likely to subcontract workers to evade labor laws.
Let the share of contract labor in total expenditures for each plant be given by:
h∗
fist = δXfist + νi + νs + νt − µfist
where νi, νs, and νt denote industry, state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. From this latent variable, we
construct a categorical variable, hfist, such that hfist = 1 if the plant hires no contract labor,
hfist = 2 when the plant spends 20% or less of their labor costs on indirect labor, and hfist = 3 when
the plant spends more than 20% of total labor expenditures on hiring labor through contractors.
Let the cutoﬀs for h∗
fist be given by ξ0 = −∞, ξ1 = 0, ξ2 = 0.2, and ξ3 = ∞. The probability of
hfist = H is given by:
Pr(hfist = H|Xfist) = Pr(ξH−1 < h∗
fist < ξH|Xfist)
= Φ(δXfist + νi + νs + νt − ξH−1) − Φ(δXfist + νi + νs + νt − ξH)
where Φ is the normal cumulative distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.
Table 4: Interval regression results for the share of contract labor in total labor expenditures
Plant size (base: < 50 workers) δ S.E.
[50 − 100[ 0.268*** 0.004
[100 − 250[ 0.300*** 0.003







Table 4 reports δ estimates from an interval regression model like the one above. We ﬁnd that
larger plants are more likely to hire labor indirectly: the share of contracted labor increases by
22a factor of 0.317 when we compare plants with 250 or more workers to plants with less than 50
workers. Similarly, relative to the smallest plants, medium size plants with 50 to 99 workers and
100 to 249 workers see their share of contract labor expenditures increased by a factor of 0.268 and
0.3, respectively. Clearly, the tendency of larger plants to hire more workers through contractors
helps them partially bypass labor legislation. Consequently, we expect them to beneﬁt less from
the state-labor reforms.
Table 5 conﬁrms our initial prediction. The coeﬃcient on the interaction between ﬂexible
EPL and labor intensity is now positive and signiﬁcant both for TFP and labor productivity (θ3).
Moreover, the coeﬃcient on triple interaction between EPL, labor intensity, and plant size (θ7) is not
signiﬁcant for medium size plants but it is negative and signiﬁcant for larger plants in both columns.
Both in terms of TFP and labor productivity, plants with more than 250 workers in industries with
high labor intensity earn much less than their smaller counterparts from pro-employer labor reforms.
This result is consistent with the fact that larger plants face higher restrictions in inﬂexible labor
regulation settings. Since many norms and regulations apply only to them, it looks like they have
found a way out by reducing their dependence on a permanent workforce and relying more on
temporary labor hired through contractors as suggested by Table 4. It has been well documented
that casual or contract labor in India provides unskilled labor at wages below the minimum wage
and without beneﬁts, so the substitution of regular labor for casual labor can help larger plants
reduce the labor costs imposed by more stringent EPL.
We also estimated the eﬀects of ﬂexible EPL separately for publicly and privately owned plants,
where Xfist is a dummy that is equal to one when the plant is publicly owned. In the sample
periods analyzed, publicly owned plants tend to have lower rates of job destruction and creation
than privately owned plants. Although public plants tend to have a lower turnover rate than
privately owned plants, their net contribution to employment is highly negative in half of the
rounds analyzed. A proposed explanation for this lies in voluntary retirement schemes (VRS),
which are used as a mutually agreeable mechanism for downsizing. Since VRS has allowed public
plants to bypass labor regulation and adjust their labor usage it may be possible that the eﬀect of
EPL within them is smaller than among private plants.
Table 6 presents the results obtained by ownership type. Public plants in labor intensive
industries tend to have higher multifactor productivity but lower labor productivity as shown by
the interaction of the ownership dummy and the labor intensity dummy. Moreover, the interaction
between pro-worker EPL reform and labor intensity is positive and signiﬁcant for both TFP and





High labor intensity -0.049 -0.125**
(0.066) (0.047)
Pro-employer EPL reform -0.032 0.202**
(0.034) (0.096)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform 0.161** 0.187***
(0.068) (0.054)
Plant Size (Base: <= 50 workers)
]50 − 100] 0.127 0.069
(0.074) (0.139)
]100 − 250] -0.023 0.290**
(0.054) (0.105)
> 250 0.049 0.604***
(0.059) (0.174)
High labor intensity x ]50-100] -0.075 0.257
(0.096) (0.178)
High labor intensity x ]100-250] 0.094 0.118
(0.130) (0.125)
High labor intensity x >250 0.278*** -0.133
(0.072) (0.221)
Pro-employer EPL reform x ]50-100] -0.063 0.042
(0.074) (0.148)
Pro-employer EPL reform x ]100-250] 0.077 -0.038
(0.059) (0.156)
Pro-employer EPL reform x >250 0.020 0.269
(0.064) (0.175)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform x ]50-100] 0.105 -0.115
(0.099) (0.187)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform x ]100-250] -0.034 -0.130
(0.138) (0.160)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform x >250 -0.154* -0.398*
(0.085) (0.229)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.044** 0.033
(0.018) (0.043)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.028 -0.018
(0.021) (0.112)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.020 -0.007
(0.014) (0.063)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




24Table 6: Eﬀect of EPL reforms on TFP and labor productivity by labor intensity and ownership




High labor intensity -0.048 -0.056
(0.051) (0.064)
Pro-employer EPL reform -0.042 0.184*
(0.049) (0.098)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform 0.213*** 0.162*
(0.060) (0.082)
Public plant 0.007 0.735***
(0.047) (0.120)
High labor intensity x Public plant 0.208** -0.274**
(0.088) (0.101)
Pro-employer EPL reform x Public plant 0.069 0.203
(0.051) (0.135)
High labor intensity x Pro-employer EPL reform x Public plant -0.243** -0.179
(0.090) (0.122)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.044** 0.040
(0.019) (0.041)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.022 -0.019
(0.022) (0.104)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.016 -0.004
(0.014) (0.059)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




25VA/L, which shows that the average beneﬁcial eﬀect of labor reform on labor intensive industries is
higher. As we expected, the triple interaction for EPL reform, labor intensity, and public ownership
is negative and signiﬁcant for both TFP and labor productivity, though only signiﬁcant for the
former. This implies that labor intensive public plants in ﬂexible markets exhibit lower TFP gains
from EPL reform, which is in line with the use of VRS among public plants as a strategy to
circumvent labor regulation. Through this strategy, constrained public plants have been able to
ameliorate the negative eﬀects of inﬂexible regulation on productivity so that pro-employer labor
reforms have smaller relative eﬀects among them.
In general, the results show that there are important TFP and some labor productivity gains
for labor intensive plants that operate in states with laxer EPL. Moreover, the diﬀerent strategies
used by plants to overcome the constraints imposed by labor regulation generate diﬀerential eﬀects
of state-level labor reform both by plant size and type of ownership.
5.1 Volatility
We now test if laxer labor regulation beneﬁts volatile industries relatively more as suggested by
Poschke (2007) and others. Our measure of volatility is similar to the one used by Krishna and
Levchenko (2009): the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of plants’ output in a given
industry. Notice that we need a plant-level growth measure to quantify volatility, so we are will
obtain a proxy for each industry from the restricted census sample, average it over all the ASI
rounds we use, and apply it to the complete sample of plants. We then construct a dummy variable
which classiﬁes industries as highly volatile when they are at or above the median industry in terms
of the average standard deviation of annual growth rate of output.
Panels (a) and (b) in Figure 6 presents preliminary evidence on the existence of a comparative
advantage among more volatile plants in ﬂexible markets. State-level labor reforms seem to shift
the TFP distribution to the right only in more turbulent industries, which is in line with Cu˜ nat and
Melitz’s (2007) ﬁndings. However, as panels (c) and (d) show, the comparative advantage identiﬁed
in terms of TFP among plants in more volatile sectors is not present for labor productivity. The
diﬀerence between the distributions of value added per worker across states with diﬀerent levels
of labor reform does not seem to vary by industry-level volatility, although plants in more ﬂexible
states always have better (VA/L) distributions.
Table 7 conﬁrms these patterns. The interaction between EPL and volatility is positive and
signiﬁcant only in the TFP equation, which implies that plants in more volatile industries that
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.
27operate in ﬂexible labor markets have a comparative advantage in terms of multifactor productivity.
The larger costs of hiring and ﬁring people imposed by strict EPL seem to be particularly restrictive
in sectors with higher volatility, generating an unequal distribution of the productivity gains that
come from labor market deregulation.




High volatility -0.052 0.097
(0.108) (0.097)
Pro-employer EPL reform -0.116 0.379***
(0.078) (0.125)
High volatility x Pro-employer EPL reform 0.225* -0.151
(0.116) (0.101)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.042** 0.030
(0.019) (0.044)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.020 0.018
(0.022) (0.114)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.016 -0.027
(0.015) (0.065)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.





In the previous section, we showed that plants in more labor intensive and/or more volatile indus-
tries are the big winners of pro-worker labor reforms in India. The interactions between higher
levels of EPL reform and labor intensity as well as between pro-worker EPL reform and volatility
were positive and signiﬁcant even after the introduction of state-level controls. Moreover, Tables
B.3 and B.4 in Appendix B show that our results are not sensitive to a diﬀerent speciﬁcation of
the labor intensity measure. Including labor intensity in the model either as the value of ˆ α or the
relative ranking of each industry implied by ˆ α does not aﬀect the results presented above.
28This section provides additional robustness tests of the impact of labor regulation on organized
manufacturing plants. First, we try out two alternative measures of EPL available in the literature.
We use Gupta et al.’s (2009) EPL index as well as the BB index updated through 2008 using
Malik (2010). The former uses the BB index, Bhattacharjea (2006)’s indicator — which takes into
account legislative and judicial interventions aﬀecting Chapter VB of the IDA — and Dougherty’s
(2009) index to construct a composite measure of labor regulation. This composite measure, which
we call EPL-G, classiﬁes states into inﬂexible, neutral, and ﬂexible in terms of their EPL strictness.
We also check if our results hold when we use industry layoﬀ propensity instead of labor intensity.
According to Bassanini et al. (2009), the ﬁrm’s natural propensity to adjust through layoﬀs will
inﬂuence the size of the costs imposed by EPL so we would expect that plants that operate in
industries that are more likely to adjust through layoﬀs will beneﬁt the most from more ﬂexible
labor laws, especially those pertaining to retrenchment and ﬁring of workers.
Table 8 shows the results using Gupta et al.’s (2009) EPL indicator.21 If we focus on the
interaction eﬀect identiﬁed for states classiﬁed as ﬂexible by EPL-G, the results are very similar
to those obtained with our measure of EPL reform. In terms of TFP gains, Table 3 reported an
interaction eﬀect of 0.153 while this eﬀect amounts to 0.143 when EPL-G is used. Although still
insigniﬁcant, the interaction eﬀect of EPL-G and labor intensity in the labor productivity equation
(0.120) is very close to the eﬀect identiﬁed in Table 3 using our EPL measure (0.124).
When the BB index is used, the positive eﬀects of labor regulation previously identiﬁed among
plants in labor intensive industries go away. Table 9 shows that when the cumulative BB index
is used, the interaction between EPL reform and labor intensity is negative and signiﬁcant in
the case of TFP though it remains insigniﬁcant for value added per worker. These results are
not too surprising if we consider that the BB index only captures formal amendments to the
IDA, which have been scarce in recent years. In fact, there were only four pro-worker reforms
registered in Gujarat (in 2004) and two pro-employer reforms in Madhya Pradesh (in 2003) after
1999. Moreover, the correlation between BB and Dougherty’s (2009) proportional index is -0.25,
which could be indicating that the lack of reforms to the IDA post-1990 were compensated by
formal or informal state-level changes in industrial practices on the ground.
We conclude by testing if plants in industries with a higher layoﬀ propensity beneﬁt the most
from labor reforms as suggested by Bassanini et al. (2009).22 The evidence provided in Table 10
21Compared to our ﬁnal sample of states, Gupta et al. (2009) misses 2 states/union territories, Delhi and Himachal
Pradesh, which represent 6.2% of the plant-year observations in our complete sample.
22Due to lack of adequate US data, tobacco industries were dropped from our original sample. This generates a
29shows that, indeed, plants in industries with higher ˆ αs are the ones who experience the largest
TFP improvements from state-level labor reforms. The magnitude of the interaction eﬀect of EPL
reforms and layoﬀ propensities implies that, on average, plants in industries with a high layoﬀ
propensity are 20% more productive in ﬂexible states than in inﬂexible states.




High labor intensity 0.055*** -0.104***
(0.007) (0.026)
Neutral EPL-G 0.006 -0.293
(0.025) (0.177)
Flexible EPL-G -0.027 -0.269
(0.025) (0.166)
High LI x Neutral EPL-G 0.052 0.144
(0.036) (0.089)
High LI x Flexible EPL-G 0.143*** 0.120
(0.042) (0.086)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.038 0.082
(0.024) (0.078)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) 0.005 0.003
(0.030) (0.119)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.001 -0.034
(0.018) (0.064)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




7 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper studies the extent to which the eﬀects of EPL on productivity among registered manu-
facturing plants change by labor intensity. To do this, we rely on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy
that includes state-level EPL reforms and industry-level labor intensity interactions. Our main ﬁnd-
ing is that there are important positive gains in terms of multifactor productivity for labor intensive
loss of 1.35% of the plant-year observations.





High labor intensity 0.193*** -0.005
(0.050) (0.115)
Neutral EPL (BB) 0.011 0.080
(0.031) (0.152)
Flexible EPL (BB) 0.022 0.338*
(0.029) (0.170)
High labor intensity x Neutral EPL (BB) -0.063 0.059
(0.055) (0.130)
High labor intensity x Flexible EPL (BB) -0.137** -0.098
(0.051) (0.116)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.040** 0.093
(0.018) (0.067)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.008 -0.037
(0.028) (0.101)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.007 -0.010
(0.017) (0.050)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




plants that operate in states with laxer labor regulation. This eﬀect remains after the addition of
state-level controls as well as various sensitivity checks. Our point estimates indicate that, on
average, plants in labor intensive industries and in ﬂexible labor markets have TFP residuals 14%
higher than those registered for their counterparts in states with more stringent labor laws. How-
ever, EPL reform does not seem to have any important eﬀect on plants with lower levels of labor
intensity. Similarly, the TFP of plants in more volatile industries and in states that experienced
pro-employer reforms is 11% higher than that of plants in volatile industries and in more restrictive
states. Among plants in less volatile industries, EPL reform seems to drive a 11% reduction in TFP
residuals. In the case of labor productivity, we fail to ﬁnd robust evidence in favor of a diﬀerential
eﬀect of EPL reform by either labor intensity or volatility.
We also ﬁnd that the diﬀerent strategies used by plants to overcome the constraints imposed




High layoﬀ propensity 0.080 -0.179**
(0.065) (0.082)
Flexible EPL -0.027 0.251***
(0.042) (0.087)
High layoﬀ propensity x Flexible EPL 0.213*** 0.179*
(0.071) (0.096)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.041* 0.033
(0.020) (0.044)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.013 0.018
(0.019) (0.114)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.009 -0.026
(0.013) (0.065)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




by labor regulations generate heterogeneous eﬀects of state-level labor reform both by plant size
and type of ownership. Given the extensive use of contract labor among large plants and voluntary
retirement schemes among public plants, smaller plants and private plants tend to accrue the largest
productivity gains from state-level labor reforms.
Our study is particularly important for three reasons. This is the ﬁrst study that makes use
of plant-level information from the ASI to evaluate the eﬀect of EPL in India. Second, we take
advantage of the recently available ASI panel data to obtain plant-level TFP measures that control
for simultaneity and selection bias using the Olley-Pakes approach. This feature is unique to our
study since previous papers on the topic have only measured the eﬀects of EPL on labor productivity
measured as value added per worker or on aggregate measures of TFP at the industry-level. Finally,
our measure of labor regulation is much more comprehensive and appropriate for the years analyzed
than the BB index, popular in the EPL literature in India. In particular, our EPL reform index
takes into account both formal and informal amendments to the labor laws at the state level.
Although the coverage of our EPL reform indicator is a plus, we acknowledge the important data
32limitations posed by the OECD index. Our analysis could greatly beneﬁt from a time series version
of the labor reform indicator that could allow us to evaluate short versus long-term eﬀects as well as
to include ﬁxed eﬀects at the state level. However, our attempts to collect a time-varying state-level
EPL indicator have not yet been successful. Since the index goes beyond formal amendments to
cover informal changes to labor rules and practices, many of which are not systematically notiﬁed
in a consolidated publication, it is very diﬃcult to track the exact dates in which these practices
actually changed at the state level.
Although we are able to take advantage of the longitudinal data available in the ASI, we are
aware that assuming that the production function estimates from the restricted census sample
are applicable to the complete sample is a little extreme. Unfortunately, this is the only way in
which we can implement the Olley-Pakes methodology to obtain clean estimates of plant-level TFP
residuals. We believe that relying on OLS estimates of multifactor productivity in the complete
sample would be even more problematic than the approach we undertake here.
Preliminary evidence shows that the eﬀect of labor regulation reforms might be non-linear,
which could potentially be explained by endogenous relocation of plants from states with more
stringent regulation to states with more ﬂexible EPL. Our future agenda includes the development
of a partial equilibrium model that can help us explain this pattern.
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36A Appendix A: Construction of Price Deﬂators
Output and value added were deﬂated by the appropriate wholesale price index (WPI) by industry
groups and subgroups with base 1993-94. Although the detailed categories for which the WPI
data is available do not exactly match the 2-digit industry classiﬁcation of the ASI, a close and
detailed comparison of the groups was undertaken to select suitable price deﬂators. Fixed capital,
investment, and invested capital were deﬂated using the WPI for machinery and equipment while
real expenditures in fuels were obtained using the WPI for fuel, power lights, and lubricants, both
with base 1993-94. To deﬂate intermediate materials, several deﬂators were used. For each factory,
the ASI gives detailed quantity and expenditure data on all intermediate goods consumed for
ﬁve broad groups: basic materials (including imports), chemicals and auxiliary materials, packing
materials, consumable stores, and materials consumed for repair and maintenance. Basic inputs and
imports are identiﬁed by 5-digit ASICC codes. Consumption of basic materials was deﬂated using
the WPI for the category that best matched 2-digit ASICC codes with base 1993-94. Imports were
deﬂated using the Unit Value Index (UVI) for imports with base 1993-94 that best matched 2-digit
ASICC codes. For chemicals and auxiliary materials the WPI of chemicals and chemical products
is used. For packing materials, a weighed average of the WPI for paper products, wood and wood
products, and jute, hemp, and mesta textiles is obtained. Consumable stores are deﬂated using
a weighted average of WPI for wood and wood products, basic metals alloys and metal products,
and chemicals and chemical products. Materials consumed for repair and maintenance are deﬂated
using WPI for machinery and machine tools.
37B Appendix B: Additional Tables
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics: All years
(a) All plants
Variable Obs Mean S.D Min Max
Output 239921 330.24 3075.47 0.01 320327.70
Value added 239921 38.47 213.83 -157.29 26969.15
Fixed capital 239921 111.22 722.22 0.00 56809.98
Number of workers 239921 175.76 420.85 0.00 21637.00
Investment 239921 14.87 128.99 0.00 17713.72
Fuel expenditures 239921 7.32 39.16 0.00 2639.63
Intermediate inputs 239921 136.33 878.74 0.00 66449.92
Share of contract labor 239726 0.09 0.20 0.00 1.00
Age of the plant 239088 20.92 19.61 0.00 208.00
Plant size dummies (based on ] workers)
< 50 239921 0.52 0.00 1.00
[50 − 100[ 239921 0.13 0.00 1.00
[100 − 250[ 239921 0.16 0.00 1.00
≥ 250 239921 0.18 0.00 1.00
Public ownership (dummy) 239785 0.23 0.00 1.00
TFP (Olley-Pakes residuals) 238961 1.05 0.47 -6.96 5.29
Labor productivity (VA/L) 222363 0.00 1.02 -5.00 4.79
Volatility (S.D. of annual growth rate of output) 239921 0.71 0.20 0.31 0.98
(b) Restricted Census sample
Variable Obs Mean S.D Min Max
Output 49895 1290.73 6642.43 0.02 320327.70
Value added 49895 154.63 446.22 -157.29 26969.15
Fixed capital 49895 455.01 1518.57 0.00 56809.98
Number of workers 49895 646.61 745.19 200.00 21637.00
Investment 49895 58.33 267.54 0.00 17713.72
Fuel expenditures 49895 29.34 81.24 0.00 2639.63
Intermediate inputs 49895 513.08 1868.66 0.14 66449.92
Share of contract labor 49873 0.10 0.18 0.00 1.00
Age of the plant 49880 28.88 25.34 0.00 208.00
Plant size dummies (based on ] workers)
< 50 49895 0.00 0.00 0.00
[50 − 100[ 49895 0.00 0.00 0.00
[100 − 250[ 49895 0.15 0.00 1.00
≥ 250 49895 0.85 0.00 1.00
Public ownership dummy 49864 0.59 0.00 1.00
TFP (Olley-Pakes residuals) 49879 1.10 0.49 -6.96 4.04
Labor productivity (VA/L) 46204 0.44 1.10 -4.14 4.79
Volatility (S.D. of annual growth rate of output) 49895 0.72 0.19 0.31 0.98





High labor intensity -0.149 -0.152
(0.161) (0.115)
Flexible EPL 0.253* 0.390***
(0.139) (0.128)
High labor intensity x Flexible EPL 0.184 0.190
(0.165) (0.120)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) -0.007 -0.018
(0.101) (0.081)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) 0.228 0.237
(0.170) (0.145)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) -0.149 -0.147*
(0.098) (0.084)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.




39Table B.3: Eﬀect of EPL reforms on TFP and VA/L by labor intensity, adding state-level controls




Labor intensity (ˆ α) -0.067 0.242**
(0.047) (0.092)
Flexible EPL -1.681*** -0.499*
(0.345) (0.278)
Labor intensity (ˆ α) x Flexible EPL 1.485*** 0.638
(0.425) (0.431)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.055*** 0.029
(0.017) (0.044)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.014 0.016
(0.025) (0.115)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.015 -0.026
(0.015) (0.065)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.




40Table B.4: Eﬀect of EPL reforms on TFP and VA/L by labor intensity, adding state-level controls




Labor intensity (ranking) -0.114 0.235**
(0.068) (0.111)
Flexible EPL -0.003 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Labor intensity (ranking) x Flexible EPL 0.016** 0.006
(0.007) (0.007)
Time-variant state controls
Log(Telephones/100 pop) 0.043** 0.030
(0.019) (0.045)
Log(Installed electricity capacity/million pop) -0.017 0.018
(0.022) (0.116)
Log(Paved roads/1000 pop) 0.014 -0.026
(0.014) (0.065)
Time-invariant state controls




Firm trend yes yes
State-level controls yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Source: Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) 1998-99 to 2007-08.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1
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